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"The Constitution is intended to meet and to fit the amazing physical, economic, and social 
requirements that confront us in this modern generation. ,, - Franklin D. Roosevelt 
Introduction 
In 2008, the global financial crisis exploded onto the world stage highlighting the modem 
conditions of globalization, financial interconnectedness, and economic vulnerability. The speed 
and the intensity of the global financial crisis have resulted in sweeping legislation challenging 
existing legal constraints and setting continuous constitutional challenges. This interaction 
between economic crisis and constitutions, applied through the lens of the current global 
financial crisis, highlights the strengths and shortcomings of certain constitutional designs. 
In this paper we will analyze two different constitutional frameworks; those granting 
general and specific rights. Generally, the United States Constitution is a charter of negative 
rights, which grants general rights rather than specific rights, and allows the Supreme Court to 
fill in the gaps. 1 Thus, individual fundamental rights are implied through the liberty provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 2 Whereas the constitutions of Portugal and 
Greece have a positive charter, that provides for specific individual rights, especially socio-
economic rights. 3 Although the intensity of the crisis and the availability of resources of each 
country vary wildly, each has been dealing with the same basic issues and challenges within their 
respective legal constraints. In particular, each country is required to balance the good of the 
state or the collective public interest against the rights and hardship of individual citizens. This 
plays out in the call for budget reductions and the corresponding cuts to services and salaries. In 
1 Mark S. Kende, The South African Constitutional Court1S Embrace of Socio-Economic Rights: A Comparative 
Perspective, 6 chap. L. Rev. 137 at 139, 151 (2003). 
2 Kende, supra note 1 at 139, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
3 PORT. CONST. & GREEK CONST. 
1 
the U.S., because specific individual rights are absent, the balancing is left to the legislature4 and 
therefore the main constitutional challenges focus on the legal scope of the federal government's 
power. In contrast, the constitutional challenges in the Eurozone focus on the infringement of 
individual social and economic rights and the struggle to implement austerity policies and severe 
budget cuts. The resulting constitutional challenges led to a finding that U.S. courts played a 
near non-existent role whereas the Eurozone courts Europe, played a much greater role. 
Part I of this paper will discuss the constitutional history of the United States concerning 
the court's role during the New Deal, where the Supreme Court was able to alter its 
interpretation of Due Process without the benefit of a formal constitutional amendment. 5 This 
change of interpretation ushered in a new framework of judicial review that allowed greater 
deference to the legislature when regulating the economy. 6 Furthermore, this paper will discuss 
and analyze the ability the U.S. government to manage the current global financial crisis within 
its existing constitutional framework, and in particular explore the lack of constitutional 
challenges to T ARP and its implementation. 
Part II will examine the case of Portugal, where the implementations of austerity policies 
have been hindered by the Portuguese Constitution. 7 The Portuguese Constitutional Court, after 
first upholding austerity measures valid on the basis of emergency economic circumstances, has 
constantly invalidated austerity measures as repugnant to the individual rights embodied in the 
4 Kende, supra note 1 at 152. {"The Supreme Court has made clear the legislative and executive branches should 
resolve socio-economic rights issues.") 
5 Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The New Deal Court: Emergence of a New Reason, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1973, 1973 (1990). 
6 Kurt T. Lash, The Constitutional Convention of 1937: The Original Meaning of the New Jurisprudential Deal, 70 
Fordham L. Rev. 459, 464-46 (2001). 
7 See Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 396/2011; see also Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] 
Rul. no. 353/2012. 
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Portuguese Constitution. 8 This judicial activism has threated Portugal's access to credit markets 
and a fragile economy still recovering from the recession. 
Part III will examine the case of Greece, which has suffered the harshest consequences of 
the global fmancial crisis. Due to the severity of the existing crisis the Greek courts have upheld 
austerity measures even though these measures infringe on individual rights guaranteed by the 
Greek Constitution. 9 The lack of constitutional protection of specific rights and the 
disintegration of the standard of living has led to widespread violent protest throughout Greece. 
Part IV will include a comparative analysis of the differences between general and 
specific constitutional framework; and additionally compare the opposite outcomes reached by 
the Portuguese and Greek courts concerning substantial similar issues of austerity. Furthermore 
we will examine the ability of the United States, through its legislature, to balance the need for 
deficit reductions and individual socio-economic rights. Finally we will conclude that in the 
specific case of economic crisis the United States constitutional framework, its experience, and 
the role of its legislature have allowed the U.S. to most successfully adapt and balance the 
pressing issues presented by the global financial crisis 
I. THE UNITED STATES 
"Our Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties . . . The men 
who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do too little for the 
people but that it might do too much to them. " -Judge Posne/0 
8 See td. See also Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 399/2010. 
9 See Panagiotis Sotiris, Greece: The EU-ECB-IMF austerity package and the challenge for the Left, Greek Left Rev., 
July 15, 2010 available at http:/Jgreekleftreview.wordpress.com/2010/07/15/greece-the-eu-ecb-imf-austeritv-
package-and-the-challenge-for-the-left/. 
1° Kende supra note 1 at footnote 2. citing Jackson v. Citv of Joliet. 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
3 
The Great Depression and Great Recession are two episodes in the U.S. constitutional 
story that pushed the constitutional limit of the federal government's ability to intervene in the 
economy. During the Great Depression the Supreme Court was seen a substantial roadblock to 
recovery and the implementation ofNew Deal Legislation. In a series of landmark decisions 
between 1935 and 1936 the Supreme Court invalidated major federal and state regulatory 
legislation based on theories of "liberty of contract" and a limited federal government. 11 By 
1937 the Supreme Court reversed itself and held federal and state regulatory legislation 
constitutional.12 This change in judicial review altered the existing constitutional interpretation 
without the requirement of a constitutional amendment and allowed the government to directly 
manage the existing emergency crisis and the economy. 13 
The Great Depression and the New Deal 
The Wall Street Crash of 1929 marked the beginning of the Great Depression which saw 
the disintegration of the national economy. 14 When Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered his 
inaugural address in March 1933, the nation's unemployment rolls listed thirteen million idle 
workers or one quarter of the work force. 15 From 1930-33, five thousand banks had failed, 
eliminating nine million savings accounts, and half of the nation's income. 16 The average man's 
desire for food and shelter put enormous stress on the political system. 17 The Roosevelt 
administration pledged a "New Deal" to combat the desperate economic condition by passing 
emergency legislation. 18 By increasing the government's role in the economy, New Deal 
11 William G. Ross, When did the "Switch in Time" Actually Occur?: Re-Discovering the Supreme Courts "Forgotten 
Decisions of 1936-1937, 37 Ariz. St. LJ. 1153, 1153-54 (2005). 
12 Ross, supra note 11 at 1154. 
13 Lash, supra note 6 at 459-60. 
14 Ross supra note 11 at 1153-54. 
15 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1973. 
161d. 
17 I d. at 1977. 
18 ld. at 1974. 
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legislation challenged the existing constitutional orthodoxy of limited government 19 and 
conventional judicial notions of substantive economic due process. 20 In order to permit 
economic reform the court had to alter its current constitutional interpretation.21 To this effect, 
the Supreme Court was able in a very short period of time to make a doctrinal revision 
abandoning substantive economic due process and the liberty of contract principal?2 In the end, 
the Supreme Court redefined due process and established a new constitutional framework that 
expanded the federal government's ability to intervene in the economy during economic crisis. 
i) Emergency Power Doctrine 
Even prior to the New Deal legislation, states passed moratoriums on foreclosures in 
response to the emergency economic situation that provided relief to struggling debtors. The 
moratory statutes were challenged by bankers and lenders as a violation of the Contract Clause 
of the U.S. Constitution.23 The Contract Clause states that "no state shall enter into any ... Law 
impairing the Obligation ofContracts.24 Home Building Loan Association v. Blaisdell25 was the 
first case where the Supreme Court upheld the use of the emergency power doctrine outside the 
context of war. 26 
In 1933, threatened by foreclosures, farmers rioted in Minnesota and petitioned the state 
legislature for protection. 27 In response, Minnesota passed a moratory statute that delayed 
foreclosure sales and extended redemption periods beyond the dates of foreclosure specified in 
19 G. Edward White, Cabining the Constitutional History of the New Deal In Time The Supreme Court Reborn: The 
Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt. By William E. Leuchtenburg. New York: Oxford University Press. 
1995. 94 Mich. L. Rev. 1392, 1393 (1996). 
20 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1987. 
21 1d. at 1974. 
221d. 
23 Home Building Loan Association v. Blaisdell. 290 U.S. 398,399-400 (1934) 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I § 10, cl. 1. 
25 Blaisdell. 290 U.S. at 400. 
26 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1988. 
27Jd. 
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the individual mortgage contracts.28 The statute authorized Minnesota courts, upon application 
by the mortgagor, to extend the existing one-year period of redemption from fore-closure sales 
for such time as was deemed equitable and further the duration of the law was limited to either 
two years (March 193 5), or if the emergency ended, whichever came first. 29 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that to the extent that the statute interfered with 
contractual obligations, there was justification based on the state's police power responding to 
the interest of a public economic emergency.30 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and upheld the 
statute despite the fact that it violated the Contract Clause of the Constitution based on the 
emergency power principal. 31 The Court craved out conditions in which a valid exercise of 
emergency power existed; the legislation must be for the protection of a basic interest of society, 
the character of the relief was appropriate to the emergency, the conditions on which relief was 
granted were reasonable and the legislation was temporary being "limited to the exigency which 
called it forth. "32 
Blaisdell has been described as representing the dawn of "living Constitution" 
jurisprudence. 33 Its majority opinion34 embodied the notion that the Constitution should adapt to 
changing circumstances. 35 It also exemplified the ultimate sovereign right of self-preservation 
which could neither be defined nor circumscribed by a formal constitutional clause. 36 As Robert 
28 Blaisdell. at 416-418. 
29 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1988. 
30 Blaisdell. at 419-20. 
31 I d. at 437. (Court held that "the economic interest of the state may justify the exercise of its continuing and 
dominant protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts.") 
32 1d. at 444-47. 
33 Lash, supra note 6 at footnote 100. See Laura Kalman, Law, Politics, and the New Deal, 108 Yale L.J. 2165, 2186-
87 (2000). 
34 Written by Chief Justice Hughes. 
35 Lash, supra note 6 at 479. 
36 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1999. 
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Jackson famously wrote, "The Constitution is not a suicide pact" douse the flames first; then 
repair the bad writing. 37 
ii) Due Process 
Congress enacted Roosevelt's recovery plan, known as the first one hundred days of 
legislation, to lift the economy from its purgatory.38 The extraordinary New Deal legislation 
challenged the constitutional orthodoxy of limited government and the traditional interpretation 
of due process, which embraced the liberty of contract. 39 During the half-century preceding the 
Depression, the Court has decided to equate the personal liberty promised by due process with 
unfettered enterprise and expanding the concept of property to a degree that limited government 
regulation.40 Although the "liberty of contract" is not an express constitutional right, the 
Supreme Court embraced the freedom of contract as a liberty protected under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment41 in Lochner v. New York.42 Based on this interpretation 
of due process the Supreme Court had broadly rejected both federal and state attempts to regulate 
the economy and provide for the welfare ofworkers.43 Between 1935 and 1936 the Supreme 
Court invalidated a number of key aspects of Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, based on 
Lochner's "liberty of contract," economic substantive due process, and a limited interpretation of 
the Commerce Clause.44 
37 ld. at 2000. 
38 Lash, supra note 6 at 476. 
39 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1999. 
40 ld. 
41-u.s. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
42 Lochner v. New York. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). (Lochner involved a New York state statute that limited the hours of 
any bakery employee to no more than sixty hours in one week. The Supreme Court invalidated the statute and 
held that the statue limiting hours of labor "interferes with the right of contract between the employer and 
employees ... and the general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the 
individual protected by the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution.") I d. at 53. 
43 ld. at 459-60. 
44-
ld. at 476. 
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In early 1935, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Railroad Retirement Act 
(RRA) in Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway Co;45 the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (NIRA) in A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp,46 and the Frazier-Lemke Act.47 In 1936 the Court 
struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act, a new coal labor code in Carter v. Carter Coal 
Company,48 and New York's minimum wage,49 which upheld the court's previous ruling in 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital. 50 
As the Supreme Court invalidated core provisions of Roosevelt's legislation, many 
believed that the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, barred escape from the 
Depression. 51 The popular conception at the time was that the government should participate in 
a regulatory capacity in the economy. 52 Charles Beard, a Constitutional historian, wrote that the 
time had come for "the ruling ideas, appropriate to the age of tallow candle and ox cart," to be 
modernized to comprehend "economic interests ... [that] have been advancing with electric 
speed under the impacts of technology and organization."53 Others viewed the Court's 
45Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railway. 295 U.S. 330,344-46 (1935). (The Railroad Retirement Act (RAA) 
established a federally administered compulsory retirement and pension system for all carriers. The law required 
present and future employees to make contributions to the retirement fund. The Court held that the RAA violated 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and stated that the "act denies due process of law by taking the 
property of one and bestowing it upon another. The Court further found that the RAA violated the Commerce 
Clause.) 
46 A.L.A. Schechter Poultrv Coro v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935). (The Live Poultry Code was written and promulgated 
by the Roosevelt administration in 1934 under the NIRA. The code fixed the maximum number of hours a poultry 
employee could work, imposed a minimum wage, and banned certain methods of unfair competition. The 
Supreme Court invalidated the act because it was an unconstitutional grant of legislative power to allow the 
president to write new codes as long as they regulated "unfair competition," reasoning that "unfair competition" 
was too ambiguous to constitute a "intelligible principle." Secondly the Court found that the act violated the 
Commerce Clause because Schechter's activities where entirely intrastate.) 
47 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 2001. (The Frazier-Lemke Act, amended the Bankruptcy Act permitting debtors to 
effect composition of their debts by forcing creditors to relinquish security. The Law was applied retroactively and 
permitted extensions up to ten years.) 
48 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
49 See Morehead v. New York ex rei. Tipaldo. 298 U.S. 587 (1936}. 
50 Adkins v. Children's Hosp .. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
51 Hulsebosch supra note 5 at 1976. 
52 ld. at 2004. 
53 1d. quoting C. Beard & G. Smith, The Future Comes 169-70 (1933). 
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interpretation of due process clause, as "the last and most formidable entrenchment of privileged 
wealth. "54 Additionally this sentiment was captured by the popular press, which wrote: 
"What we need now is martial law: this is no time for civil law. The 
President should have dictatorial powers. The edicts of the Constitution 
do not interfere with a general when he is fighting a battle; and the 
Constitution should not interfere with the remedies which are essential to 
get us out of this appalling depression. "55 
Others, placed the blame on the Justices themselves, in a book before he joined the court Robert 
Jackson wrote that ''the immediate difficulty was with the Justices, not the Court of the 
Constitution. "56 
In 193 7, in an effort to clear constitutional hurdles, Roosevelt had submitted his court 
packing plan, 57 and Congress itself was considering a number of constitutional amendments. 58 
Both proposed plans were rendered moot when the Supreme Court, and in particular Justice 
Robert, changed its interpretation of due process, which effectively abandoned Lochnerian 
doctrine and allowed the New Deal to proceed. 59 The switch is generally regarded as having 
occurred. with the Supreme Court's legitimating of Washington State's minimum wage in West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 60 which overruled Adkins and a fifteen year old precedent to the 
contrary.61 Parrish, ushered in an entire new method of judicial review that granted great 
54 1d. quoting I. Brant, Storm Over the Constitution 242 (1936). 
55 ld. at 1978 quoting Madadden, "This is War," Says General Pershing, Liberty, June 25, 1932, at 4, 4. 
56 Lash, supra note 6 at 475 quoting Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial Supremacy 70 (1941). 
57 President Roosevelt proposed to increase the Court's membership by adding one justice for every Supreme 
Court justice over the age of seventy to ensure favorable treatment of New Deal Legislation. Hulsebosch, supra 
note 5 at footnote 31. 
58 Lash, supra note 6 at 476-77. (Proposed Amendments fell along two main lines; those which sought to 
restructure the nature of judicial review, for example by providing for a congressional override of judicial opinions 
and those which sought to increase the regulatory power of government by permitting regulation of labor and the 
economy.) 
59 1d. at 460. 
60 West Coast Hotel v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
61 White, supra note 20 at 1415. 
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deference to legislatures when regulating the economy.62 The Court reconstituted due process in 
a manner that allowed the legislature to make policy and since the Court's decision in Parrish, 
not a single regulatory law has been struck down as beyond Congress' commerce power.63 
Due to the flexibility of the U.S. Constitution by granting general rights, the Supreme 
Court was able to alter the shape of judicial review and in doing so the interpretation of due 
process without the benefit of a formal constitutional amendment. 64 President Roosevelt's 
critique that "we have been relegated to the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce" 
had been overturned, 65 and the shift can be considered a "rebirth" in which the American 
constitutional system adapted to modemity.66 Thus, the U.S. government was armed with the 
tools to implement legislative solutions to economic problems confronted by a modem world. 
Great Recession 
"This is the financial equivalent of war and we are going to need wartime power. " -
Hank Paulson Secretary of Treasure to President George W. Bush. 
The global financial crisis came to a head in 2008 with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, 
but its roots stem back to the real-estate bubble and the collapse of the market for mortgage 
backed securities.67 The U.S. real-estate bubble was created by inflated housing prices fueled by 
a rapid rise of subprime lending68 and the packaging of mortgage back securities. 69 Subprime 
62 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 2016. 
63 Lash, supra note 6 at 478. 
64 ld. at 464-46. 
65 Lash, supra note 6 at 479. 
66 White, supra note 20 at 1392. 
67 Martin Neil Baily, Robert E. Litan, & Matthew S. Johnson, The Origins of the Financial Crisis, Fixing Finance Series-
Paper 3, at 7 (2008}. 
68 Subprime loans (or mortgages) are loans to unqualified buyers. Prior to 2000 subprime lending was non-
existent, but the sustained rise in the housing market and the bundling of mortgages made subprime lending 
lucrative and attractive. This increase in lending led to more demand for new houses which in turn led to an 
oversupply of housing on the market growing the real estate bubble. Additionally, many of these loans included 
10 
mortgages were "securitized"70 by being pooled together with prime mortgages into 
"packages."71 These packages were sold to financial institutions that used these pooled 
mortgages to back other financial instruments, 72 which were sold to investors all over the 
world. 73 As financial institutions made huge profits creating and selling these instruments, easy 
monetary policies and low interest rates created an incentive for financial institutions to borrow 
large sums of money to finance the purchase of more mortgage-backed securities. 74 The 
increased borrowing led to a high level of financial leverage on the fmancial books of investment 
banks, which multiplied profits but also exposed them to greater risk if real-estate prices were to 
fall. 75 When the housing bubble finally burst, the value of securities tied to the real estate 
markets plummeted inflicting severe instability on the entire financial system. Lehman Brothers, 
due to its massive property investments, saw its stock price free fall, and was forced to file 
bankruptcy. 76 
i) TARP 
The fallout from the collapse of Lehman Brothers threatened the stability of the entire 
banking system. As the breakdown in the banking system and credit market spread throughout 
the economy, the United States was inflicted with the worst economic crisis since the Great 
forms ~f predatory lending. For example, borrowers had poor credit histories and banks used attractive mortgage 
incentives such as no down payments, teaser rates, or postponed interest payments to increase lending. ld. 
691d. 
7
° Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac guaranteed these "mortgage-backed securities" to ensure their marketability. ld. 
7lld. 
72 Also known as collateralized debt obligations (COOs). These COOs were then sliced into tranches by degree of 
exposure to default or risk and sold to investors depending on their appetite for risk. The Origins of the Financial 
Crisis: Crash Course, The Economist, Sep. 7, 2013. 
73Jd. 
74Jd. 
75 Baily supra note 73 at 7-8. 
761d. 
11 
Depression. 77 The symptoms were substantial; foreclosures were at an all-time high, real estate 
values plummeted, businesses scaled down, unemployment exploded, the DOW plummeted, and 
consumer spending and confidence were shaken. 78 In response, Congress enacted the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), which created the Troubled Asset 
Relief Program (T ARP). 79 The purpose ofT ARP was ''to immediately provide authority and 
facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the 
national financial system."80 At its heart, TARP granted significant authority to the Secretary81 
to spend $700 billion to remove distressed assets from the financial banking system, which in 
essence allowed the government to infuse a large amount of capital into the economy for the 
purpose of stabilizing the market. 82 
Courts have yet to address any constitutional challenges to T ARP, 83 but many groups84 
have asserted its unconstitutionality. The principal constitutional issue rests on the claim that 
T ARP is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and violates the non-delegation 
principle. 85 The crux of the argument rests on the fact that legislative power is constitutional 
vested in Congress86 and Congress may not delegate away that power to another branch of 
n Erik D. Klingenberg, Summary and Analysis of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 62 Consumer Fin. L.Q. Rep. 26 
(2008). 
78 1d. 
79 Stephen Smith, Standing up to Nothing: Why TARP Has Not Become a Constitutional Case, at 515 (2011). 
80 12 U.S.C.A § 5201(1). 
81 TARP authorized the Secretary "to purchase ... troubled assets from any financial institution, on such terms and 
conditions as are determined by the Secretary." 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211. The act further states that such authority 
must be exercised in a manner to protect the value of personal investments, minimize foreclosures, boost the 
economy, maximize the return on investment, and provide accountability to the public. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5213. 
82 Smith, supra note 85 at 515-16. 
83 Cases that have challenged TARP's constitutionality have been dismissed for lack of standing. See Texans Against 
Governmental Waste and Unconstitutional Governmental Conduct v. U.S. Dep. of Treas .• 619 Supp. 2d 274, 275-
276 (N.D. Tex. 2009). 
84FreedomWorks Organization challenged TARP's constitutionality. 
85 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 {1991). 
86 Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution vests "all legislative powers herein granted" in Congress. U.S. CON ST. 
art I §1. Further in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution provides that Congress has the power to "regulate 
Commerce." U.S. CONST. art. I §8 cl. 3. 
12 
government. However the non-delegation principle is not a ban on all Congressional 
delegations, and is satisfied when Congress "lays down by legislative act an intelligible principle 
to which the person or body authorized to act is directed to conform. "87 
Therefore T ARP' s constitutionality rests on whether Congress has satisfied the 
"intelligible principle" requirement and provided a permissible scope of authority to the 
Secretary. The "intelligible principle" analysis depends on factors such as the scope of 
legislative authority granted, the power that is granted, and the constraints imposed on the 
exercise of that power. 88 Here, T ARP grants the Secretary broad authority to purchase $700 
billion worth of "toxic assets. "89 The act places some restraints on the Secretary by stating that 
the Secretary must exercise in a manner that "prevent unjust enrichment of financial 
institutions,"90 "maximize overall returns to the taxpayers of the United States,"91 and 
additionally consider the following factors; the value of personal investments, minimize 
foreclosures, boost the economy, maximize the return on investments and provide accountability 
to the public. 92 
An argument can be made that T ARP grants extraordinary broad authority to the 
Secretary that impacts the entire national economy with only vague conditions on the exercise of 
that authority. 93 Since the Great Depression the Supreme Court has generally interpreted the 
"intelligible principle" test to allow broad delegations of powers, but due to the amount of money 
involved combined with the lack of sufficient oversight make the bailout different enough from 
87 J.W. Hampton. Jr .. & United States. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) . 
88 Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (The degree of agency discretion that is acceptable 
varies according to the scope of the power congressionally confer.) 
89 12 u.s.c. §5201(1). 
90 12 U.S.C. §5211(e) 
91 12 u.s.c. §5201(1) 
92 12 u.s.c. §5213. 
93 Freedom Works Foundation, Constitutional Infirmities of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 
("ESSA"): A Legal Analysis from Freedom Works Foundation, No. 124 at 8 (2009). 
13 
previous delegations. 94 In an interview concerning the bailout, Harvard Law Prof. Laurence H. 
Tribe, stated "that any such challenge was unlikely to succeed because the doctrine of 
Congressional delegation was significantly weakened during the New Deal and never 
recovered.95" Prof. Tribe further said that the bailout [TARP] "certainly tests the outer limits of 
Congressional delegation authority," and "if the delegation were genuinely alive and well, TARP 
might be among its potential victims. "96 
The Obama administration in July 2009, went a step further when it used TARP funds to 
assist automakers by purchasing their debts in a government-assisted bankruptcy restructuring. 97 
This was done after Congress had effectively killed the Auto Industry Financing and 
Restructuring Act of 2008, which would have gave Congressional consent for the auto bailout. 98 
The purpose of the auto-bailout was to save millions of jobs at a time of economic emergency, 
but it pushed the constitutional limits of federal power because T ARP was limited to apply only 
to financial institutions.99 Thus it is argued that the Secretary illegally expanded the definition of 
any financial institutions100 to included car manufacturers. 101 Although there has been no court 
ruling on the constitutionality of the bailouts, it is clear that the federal power exercised 
represents the outer limits of a constitutional exercise of federal power. 
Today, an unconstitutional decision would have little practical effect as it is unlikely that 
the money spent could be recovered. However, the lack of an unconstitutional ruling 
94 John Armey, Some Ask if the Bailout is Unconstitutional, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 2009, at A16 available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16challenge.html. 
95 ld. 
961d. 
97 Smith, supra note 85 at 515. 
98 I d. at 527. 
99-
12 U.S.C.A. § 5211{a)(1}. 
100 Although not exhaustive the EESA definition for financial institutions applies to "any bank savings association, 
credit union, security broker or dealer, or insurance company." 12 U.S.C.A. 5205{5}. 
101Smith, supra note 85 at 526. (Note: that the money was actually paid to GM's and Chryslers' "financial" arm.) 
14 
demonstrates the government's continued ability to enact recovery legislation.102 This exercise 
of federal power to regulate the economy is rooted in the constitutional experience from the 
Great Depression. 103 The positive experience with the New Deal period of the active federal 
approach to the Depression in the form of industrial recovery programs and regulation are partly 
due to the idea and pragmatic reasons for not limiting the government's maneuvering room 
during economic crises. 104 This experience combined with the flexible characteristic of the U.S. 
Constitution has allowed for an existing constitutional framework to readily accommodated new 
responses 105 to modern problems exemplified in the responses to the financial crisis. 
II. PORTUGAL 
The global financial crisis, rooted in the U.S. subprime crisis, swiftly crossed the Atlantic 
and mutated into the European sovereign-debt crisis. The sovereign-debt crisis describes the 
disruption of credit markets where the weaker southern countries 106 of the Eurozone plagued by 
high debt-GDP ratios were unable to borrow credit at sustainable rates. 107 The inability to 
sustainably borrow credit forced these countries to seek bailout packages from the "Troika" 
which included the international lenders, International Monetary Fund, the European Central 
Bank, and the Europeans Commission. 108 Fearing an expansion of the crisis and a deeper 
recession, European leaders had no choice but to provide emergency funds to the debt stricken 
countries to safeguard the financial stability of the entire Eurozone. 109 However, the Troika 
102 Xenophon Contiades, Constitutions in the Global Financial Crisis A Comparative Analysis, 300 (2013). 
103 For example the weak to non-existent constitutional constraints of the non-delegation doctrine are rooted in 
the Court's New Deal rulings. ld. 
104 Hulsebosch, supra note 5 at 1987. 
105 For example the authorization of bailouts that nearly socialize the banking and auto-industry. 
106 Commonly referred to as PIGIS; Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Italy, and Spain. 
107 Contiades, supra note 113 at 219-220. 
108 Aristidis Bitzenis, loannis Papadopoulos & Vasileios A. Vlachos, Reflection on the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis: 
The EU Institutional Framework, Economic Adjustment in an Extensive Shadow Economy, Cambridge Scholars 
Publishing. (2013) at 3. 
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conditioned these loans on the implementation of deficit reduction policies known as austerity. 110 
These austerity measures or belt tightening included reductions of salaries and pension benefits 
for public employees, cuts in public services and job cuts, retroactive taxes, and alterations in 
collective bargaining. 111 The implementation austerity policies have created constitutional 
issues in each country as they attempt to satisfy their obligations under the loan agreement or 
Memorandum. 112 
Portugal felt effects of the global financial crisis immediately in 2008. 113 After chronic 
financial mismanagement, overspending, and a bloated public sector, the following two years 
accompanied by low economic growth, and an exacerbated sovereign credit market provoked by 
Greece's near financial meltdown. 114 In 2010, Moody's Investor Service cut Portugal's bond 
rating down two notches as Portuguese debt exploded with a high debt-GDP ratio. 115 In April 
2011, in an attempt to stabilize its financial situation, 116 Portugal requested a €78 billion bailout 
package from the Troika. 117 On May 17,2011 the bailout agreement or Memorandum118 was 
signed by the Portuguese Government. 119 The Portuguese State agreed to the conditions set by 
the Memorandum, which required a strong restructuring of social, economic, and financial 
policy aimed at reducing public budget deficits. 120 The manifestation of the policy, imposed by 
1101d. 
11lid. 
112 Contiades, supra note 113 at 220. 
113 ld. at 219. 
114 Martinho Lucas Pires, Private Versus Public or State Versus Europe? A Portuguese Constitutional Tale, Mich J. 
lnt'l L Emerging Scholarship Project (2013) available at www.miionline.org/wordpress/wp-
content/uploads/2013/pires.pdf at 101. 
115 Contiades, supra note 113 at 219. 
116After Greece's near meltdown, interest rates tied to Portuguese debt soared to more than 7%. The rescue 
package was necessary in order to keep the country's financing cost from escalating and to service its debts. Pires, 
surpa note 126 at 101. 
117 Contiades, supra note 113, at 219. 
118 The Memorandum consisted of three separate documents. I d. 
119 Pires, supra note 126 at 101. 
120 ld. 
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. . 
the Memorandum and passed by the Portuguese legislature, challenges some of the most 
fundamental principles embodied in the Portuguese Constitution.121 
Portugal's Constitution was written in 1976 after the socialist "Carnation Revolution," 
which rid the country of dictatorship and led to its democratization. 122 In an effort to turn away 
from its past dictatorship, the Portuguese Constitution of 1796 ("Constitution") is one of the 
strongest constitutions in Europe in regards to the protection of social rights. 123 The Constitution 
"ensures the primacy of ... a democratic state based on the rule of law and open up a path 
towards a socialist society. " 124 Additionally obliges the state to promote employment, move 
toward free health and educational services and develop centers of rest and holiday for 
workers. 125 In reference to the legal force of those rights the Constitution states; "The law may 
only restrict rights, freedoms and guarantees in cases expressly provided for in the Constitution, 
and such restrictions must be limited to those needed to safeguard other constitutionally 
protected rights and interests."126 The constitutional order guarantees social state, equality, labor 
and social security as its core rights and freedoms, and the crisis has presented a challenge to 
Portugal's core ideals and principals. 
Court Decisions 
Many of the first measures passed to manage the crisis were upheld based upon the 
extreme economic situation threatening the country. Since the beginning of the sovereign debt 
crisis, the Portuguese Constitutional Court ("Court") has been confronted with policies 
1211d. 
122 Christina M Akrivopoulou, Striking Down Austerity Measures: Crisis Jurisprudence in Europe, lnt'l J. Const. L. 
Blog, June 26, 2013, available at www .iconnectblog.com/2013/06/striking-down-austerity-measures-crisis-
jurisprudence-in-Europe/. 
1231d. 
124 PORT. CONST. Preamble 
125 Patricia Kowsmann, New Hurdle in Battling Crisis: Constitutions, W.S.J. Sep. 26, 2013 available at 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323864604579069350790061202. 
126 PORT. CONST. art. 18 (2). 
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conflicting with rights guaranteed by the Portuguese Constitution.127 On the other hand the cuts 
are necessary in order to access credit from the bailout. 128 In 2010 the first measures were 
enacted to address the country's runaway deficits, when the Portuguese government 
implemented a retroactive tax. 129 The Portuguese Constitution explicitly forbids explicitly 
forbids retroactive taxation. 130 Upon review the Portuguese Constitutional Court upheld the 
new tax on the grounds that it was merely retrospective and was necessary to accomplish 
compelling fiscal objectives. 131 
In the Constitutional Court's decision 396/2011, the Court was asked to consider the 
constitutionality of an extra tax132 and a reduction of salaries133 aimed at public employees. 134 
The Court found that the measures were discriminatory because they targeted public sector, 
which violates of the constitutional principle of equity. 135 However, the Court further found that 
the measures were justified in the framework of the economic crisis and due to the overriding 
interest of the public welfare in the state's ability to acquire new loans for the citizens' general 
welfare. 136 Furthermore, the Court warned that the measures were justified so long as the 
situation remained exceptional, time-constrained, within certain limits, and anything beyond 
would be unjustified and therefore unconstitutional.137 Thus in the Court's first two decisions 
regarding austerity, the Court found that although the measures violated parts of the Portuguese 
127 Contiades, supra note 113 at 235. 
1281d. 
129 ld. at 234. 
130-PORT. CONST. art. 103.3; PORT. CONST. art. 18. 
131 Tribunal Constitutional [Port. Const. Ct.] 399/2010. 
132 This tax was an extra tax at the rate of 2 per cent on all income earned in 2011. See Contrides, supra note 113 
at 235. 
133 Salary reduction of the public sector was between 5 and 10 per cent. See I d. 
134 Contiades, supra note 113 at 235-36. 
135 ld. at 234; see Port. CONST. art. 13. 
136 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
137 Pires, supra note 126 at 104. 
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Constitution, the emergency economic situation justified their constitutionality, albeit with 
warning. 
Since the Court's first two decisions, austerity measures that infringe on constitutionally 
protected rights have been almost routinely struck down. In July of2012 the Court considered 
two provision, Article 21 and 25, of the 2012 Budget Law. 138 Article 21 consisted of a salary 
cut, based on the suspension of two subsidies in annual salaries in the form of a Christmas-
month (13th month) and a holiday-month (14th month) for public workers. 139 Article 25 
concerns the suspension of the same subsidies but for pensioners. 140 The suspension provision 
would only run for three years, 2012 to 2014, but would be a considerable; decreases in salary 
up to 25% and a minimum reduction of 14% of pension value. 141 In response workers 
challenged the provisions alleging that the articles violated four principals142 of the Portuguese 
Constitution.143 In the Constitutional Court Decision 353/2012,144 nine of the twelve judges 
declared these provisions unconstitutional as violating Article 13 of the Constitution.145 The 
Court first found a violation of the principle of equity146 due to the targeting of the public sector, 
and then considered whether this discrimination was justified.147 The Court noted the clear 
temporal limits of the provisions, but also considered the substantial financial impact on the 
lives of public workers pointing out that the cuts had a long and strong effect on the economic 
138 Pires, supra note 126 at 102-3. 
139 ld. at 103. 
140 ld. 
1411d. 
142 Petitioners alleg«;!d violations of (1) the principle of trust, a necessary element of the Rule of Law, established by 
article 2 of the Constitution; (2) Failed the necessary test in the assessment of proportionality further alleging that 
the Government could have achieved the same result through less burdensome means; (3) The principle of: 
equality, established by Article 13 of the Constitution; (4) the principle of social security protected by article 63 of 
the Constitution because it frustrated the expectations of worker's contribution to the system. I d. at 103-4. 
143ld. 
144 Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Canst. Ct.] 353/2012. 
145 Pires, supra note 126 at 104. 
146 Port. Canst. Art. 13(1)-(2). 
147 Pires, supra note 126 at 104. 
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"stability" of citizens. The Court reasoned that because the reduction in salary of public 
workers was so substantial and no similar reductions extended to the private sector, these 
provisions are distinguished from those upheld in Const. Ct. Rul. 396/2011.148 Therefore the 
court held that the deliberate targeting of public sector workers with such an intense salary 
reduction violated the equity principle. 149 However, the Court also considered the severity of 
the financial situation and the need to satisfy the conditions of the Memorandum, and the Court 
permitted the enforcement of the measures for the current budget year of 2012, but suspended 
its effect for 2013 and 2014.150 
In the Constitutional Court decision 187/2013 handed down in April, 2013 the Court 
struck down four austerity measures151 introduced in the 2013 national budget law.152 The 
measures considered a tax on unemployment and sickness benefits, and cuts in wages and 
pensions. 153 The Court again recognized the seriousness of the current financial situation and the 
need to attain the public deficit goals included in the specific policy conditions laid down in the 
Memoranda, however the Court reasoned that these measures went beyond the limits established 
by the prohibition on excess where proportional equality is concerned. 154 
1481d. 
1491d. 
150 ld. at 105. 
151 Four provisions unconstitutional; {1) Suspension of the additional holiday month of salary, based upon the 
violation of the principle of equity that requires the just distribution of public costs, because no sacrifices imposed 
on earnings from other income;{2) Suspension of the holiday month of salary under teaching and research 
contracts as violations of the principle of equity; (3) Partial Suspension of the holiday moth for pensioners, based 
on similar violations of the principle of equity; (4) Contribution payable on unemployment and sickness benefits, 
based on violations of the principle of proportionality. The Court reasoned that the Constitution says that workers 
have a right to material asisistance for unemployment and for workers who are ill within the context of a social 
security system. The Court further states that although there is no right to a concrete amount of assistance, when 
reduction is so that makes the welfare function unviable violates the Constitution. ld. see Tribunal Constitucional 
[Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 187/2013. 
152 Pires, supra note 126 at 105. 
1531d. 
154 Pires, supra note 126; see ~Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. no. 187/2013. ' 
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Following this pattern the Court again struck down parts of Portugal's revised Labour 
Code, 155 in which the reforms were imposed by the terms of the Memorandum and officials from 
the troika.156 The reforms157 attempted to make it easier for companies to shed workers and to 
make the workplace more flexible by firing workers whose posts became redundant. 158 The 
Court held that these measures violated guarantees of secure employment, 159 which prohibits the 
firing of workers without just cause. 160 In particular he Court reasoned that the regulations in the 
reform were too vague, and if left it up to the discretion of companies to decide on whether 
layoffs are justified.161 The Court further reasoned that "the law does not provide the necessary 
regulation indications about the criteria that should be used by a company in deciding which jobs 
should be cut," and stated that this "opens the door for arbitrary and legally uncontrollable 
dismissals."162 The Court further states that the key aspects of the article that gave the labor code 
precedence over collective hiring agreements violate the constitutional right that protects unions 
and collective bargaining. 163 
155 The Labour Code 2012, Law No. 23/2012. 
156 Paul Mitchell, Portugal Enforces Labour Reforms but more demanded, W.S.W.S, August 6, 2012 available at 
https:ljwww.wsws.org/en/articles/2012/08/port-a06.html. See Tribunal Constitucional [Port. Const. Ct.] Rul. No. 
602/2013. 
157 They included a suspension of the employer's obligation to find the displaced workers alternative employment; 
and instituted a program where public employees would be placed into retraining programs and eventually lay off 
those who aren't placed in new jobs after 12 months. Additionally it is important to note that these reforms target 
the private sector. ld. 
158 EL Pais, Portuguese Constitutional Court rules aspects of labor reform illegal, Sep. 26, 2013 available at 
http:l/elpais.com/elpais/2013/09/26/inenglish/1380205619 415536.html. 
159 PORT. CONST. ch. Ill art 53 (Job Security); "Workers are guaranteed job security, and dismissal without fair 
cause for political or ideological reasons is prohibited." 
160 Dinamia Maria da Paz Campos Lima, The Court Rules Some Austerity Measures to be Unconstitutional, European 
Industrial relations observatory on-line, Nov. 12, 2013 available at 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2013/10/articles/pt1310019i.htm. 
1611d. 
1621d. 
163 PORT. CONST. ch. Ill art. 56 (Trade union rights and collective agreements.); states in pertinent part (l}''Trade 
unions have the competence to defend and promote the defense of the rights and interests of the workers they 
represent." ... (2) Trade unions have the right (a)To take part in drawing up labor legislation; ... (e) To take part 
in corporate restructuring processes,~especially with regard to training actions or when working conditions are 
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The Portuguese Constitutional Court and the Portuguese Constitution have placed a 
substantial roadblock for legislatures attempting to reduce deficits and comply with the 
conditions imposed by the Memorandum. Precedent set by the Court has fueled current fears 
that important aspects of the 2014 Budget will also be invalidated. 164 In a recent statement by 
Troika officials have identified challenges by the Court as potentially the biggest threat to 
Portugal's effort to meet budget goals and to exit the bailout next year. 165 In 2014 the 
government needs to cut the deficit to 4 percent of GDP down from 5.5 percent this year. 166 If 
Portugal is unable to meet its budget goals it may hinder access to private credit markets and 
require the application for a second bailout. 167 Alternatively a negative ruling on the 2014 
budget would force the government to find alternative means of cutting spending to replace the 
potential lost savings and achieve its budget goals. 168 The government's measures would likely 
include tax hikes that could undermine a fragile economy recovering from a recession. 169 Thus 
the problem imposed on policy makers is that deficit measures must comply with the Portuguese 
Constitution and if they are invalidated, the result would restrict access to credit market requiring 
a second bailout, or critical tax hikes to make up for the short fall in revenue, threatening 
altered ... {3) Trade Unions have the competence to exercise the right to enter into collective agreements, which 
right shall be guaranteed as laid down by law. 
164 Axel Bugge, Portugal Budget vote to trigger challenges to austerity, Reuters {UK), Nov. 25, 2013, available at 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/11/25/uk-portugal-bailout-idUKBRE9AOOHU20131125. 
165 ld. 
166 Bugge, supra note 176. 
167 Constitutional Difficulties: A court ruling could force Portugal to seek a second bailout, The Economist, Apr. 13, 
2013 available at http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21576144-court-ruling-could-force-portugal-seek-
second-bail-out-constitutional-difficulties. 
168 Bugge, supra note 176. 
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recovery.170 This precarious situation has moved the Prime Minister of Portugal, Mr. Passos 
Coelho, to call to revise the constitution to slim down the welfare state. 171 
III) GREECE 
The global financial crisis hit the Greek economy like a sledgehammer, and the intensity 
of its effects are unmatched throughout the Eurozone, threatening bankruptcy and violent social 
unrest. 172 The sovereign-debt crisis began in late 2009, when the Greek government announced 
that previous reports on its official deficit were misleading. 173 Cooking the books combined with 
severe public finance mismanagement174 and tax evasion put the Greek economy into a death 
spiral. 175 In December 2009, the country's credit rating was downgraded from A- to BBB+ with 
a negative outlook. 176 The loss of Greece's market credibility caused investors to demand a 
higher yield on Greek bonds, which increased the borrowing costs. 177 As credit markets dried 
up, Greece was unable to borrow funds at a sustainable rate to service its debt obligations, and in 
April2010 requested a bailout package from the Troika. 178 In May, 2010 Greece agreed to the 
terms of the bailout and signed the "Memorandum," which required the implementation of 
austerity measures to meet specific deficit reduction targets. 179 The bailout agreement with the 
170 ld. 
171 Constitutional Difficulties: A court ruling could force Portugal to seek a second bailout, The Economist, Apr. 13, 
2013 available at http://www .economist.com/news/ eu rope/21576144-court -ruling-could-force-portugal-seek-
second-bail-out-constitutional-difficulties. (The Socialists (PS) refuses to discuss any constitutional reforms on 
ideological grounds depriving the two thirds majority required. Also attack the austerity reforms as creating 
unemployment, deepening the recession, and bringing the country to the brink of social tragedy.) 
172 Panagiotis Sotiris, Greece: The EU-ECB-IMF austerity package and the challenge for the Left, Greek Left Rev., July 
15, 2010 available at http :1/greekleftreview. wordpress.com/2010/07/15/greece-the-eu-ecb-imf-austerity-
package-and-the-challenge-for-the-left/. 
1731d. 
174 Contriades supra note 113 at 195-96. (Corruption, clientelism and low competitiveness met the effects of the 
global financial crisis of 2008 with its negative impact on Greece's main industries pushed the country into 
recession.) 
1751d. 
176Contriades, supra note 113 at 196. 
1771d. 
178 ld. at 196. 
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Troika represented an aggressive restructuring plan to implement massive social and economic 
reform. 180 The adoption of austerity policies has coincided with violent protests, a deep 
recession, dramatic rise of unemployment, mass exodus of emigrants, rising suicide rate and 
extremism.181 Since 2008, the Greek economy has shrunk 23 percent and is expected to diminish 
another 4.2 percent for 2013. 182 Even more distressing is Greece's unemployment, which has 
tripled since 2008 nearing 30 percent, which is even worse among Greek youth and has exploded 
to over 60 percent. 183 
The main legislative piece of the first Geek bailout is Law 3845/2010, which 
incorporated the terms of the Memorandum into Greek Law accompanied by severe budget cuts. 
Law 3847/2010 created a reduction in the public wage bill by reducing the Easter, summer, and 
Christmas bonuses and allowances paid to civil servants. 184 In order to access the credit under 
the terms of the Memorandum the Greek government must meet certain deficit reduction targets 
by additional rounds of budget cuts. 185 Under the terms of the 2011 bailout, the government has 
until the end of2013 to move 25,000 civil servants into a labor reserve at reduced pay and the 
likelihood oflayoffs. 186 Furthermore it is the first time under the Greek Constitution that public 
sector workers will lose their jobs, with another 15,000 redundancies expected by the end of 
2014.187 Other constitutional provisions, such as the right to free university education will be hit 
180 ld. 
181 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
182 Greek Crisis: Mass Strikes Over Civil Servant Job Cuts, B. B.C. News, Sep. 16, 2013 available at 
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/news/world-europe-24105379. 
183 George Georgiopoulos & Renee Maltezou, Greek Youth Unemployment Rises Above 60 Percent, Huff. Post, May 
9, 2013 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/09/greek-youth-unemployment- n 3244437.html 
184 Contiades, supra note 113 at 205-7. 
185 ld. at 208. 
186 Patricia Kowsmann, New Hurdle for Resolving Euro Crisis: Constitutions, W.SJ., Sep. 26, 2013 at A13. 
1871d. 
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hard by the layoffs. 188 By July, 2013 some 4,500 civil servants, mostly teaching staff, were 
already redeployed or laid off, as four out of forty universities are shut down and other operating 
half staffed. 189 With high levels of unemployment stiff resistance to the job cuts imposed by the 
bailout conditions has resulted in violent protests across Greece centered in Athens. 190 By June 
2013, 64 percent of Greeks opposed the government's latest austerity measures, putting strong 
political pressure on the establishment as the ruling coalition struggles to avoid collapse. 191 
In addition to violent protests the austerity measures has prompted constitutional 
challenges to the introduction of taxes, enforcement of severe budget cuts, public sector layoffs, 
and the reductions in pensions and salaries in the public sector that violate social rights 
guaranteed by the Greek Constitution.192 On these challenges, the Greek Council of State has 
routinely upheld the legality of the austerity measures, due to the severity of the economic 
crisis. 193 
Court Decisions 
The Greek Council of State, 194 in case 668/2012, upheld the austerity measures 
prescribed in the first Memorandum, concerning budget cuts and reductions in salaries and 
pension of the public sector by taking into account the need to serve the goals of general public 
interest. 195 The Council reasoned that the principles of proportionality, equality, the fair 
distribution of public burdens and the right to property were not infringed since the need to 
service the country's external debt and the enhancement of its financial credibility were crucial 
188 Petition: Geek University, Greek Left Rev., Oct. 24, 2013 available at 
http:/lgreekleftreview.wordpress.com/2013/10/24/petition-greek-universitv/ 
189ld. 
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° Kowsmann, supra note 198. ' 
191 Terrance Heath, Austerity Battle Heating Up In Greece, campaign for America's Future, July 17, 2013 available 
at http:/lourfuture.org/20130617/austeritv-battle-heating-up-in-greece. 
192 Kowsmann, supra note 198. 
193 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
194 Greece's highest administrative Court (do not have a Constitutional Court). 
195 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
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to the public's interest. 196 The decision was largely based on the basis of Greece being in 
economic need. 197 
In 2013, the Greek Council of State in judgment 1685/2013 upheld an increased financial 
contribution in taxes for annual incomes exceeding 60,000 euros. 198 It justified the measure due 
to the need of protect the public interest and held that Law 3758/2009, did not violate the 
constitutional restrictions, 199 permitting the retroactivity of laws that impose taxes only for the 
year prior to their adoption.200 Also in 2013, the Greek court justified additional cuts and layoff 
to the public sector in accordance with the Memorandum. The Court held that the measures did 
not to violate the principles of equity and the fair distribution of burdens and were justified by 
the emergency state of the Greek economy. 
Despite the Greek Council consistent of upholding austerity measures some Greek courts 
have begun to control the policies implemented by the Memorandum.201 In order to unlock the 
next round of aid the Greek government proposed another round of austerity measures in the 
2013 budget plan.202 The austerity package included pension reform203 and the elimination of 
annual bonuses for state employees. 204 The austerity measures were challenged before the Greek 
Court of Auditors, which vets Greek laws before they are submitted to parliament. 205 In 
196Jd. 
197Jd. 
198Jd. 
199 GREEK CONST. art. 78. 
200 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
201Jd. 
202 John Kolesidis, Greek Court Challenges Pension Reform Plan, Reuters, Nov. 1, 2012, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/us-greece-pensions-idUSBRE8A01E220121101. 
203 Jd. (The reform included increasing the retirement age two years to 67 and cutting pension by 5-10% of over 
1,000€. This was the sth time since the 2010 bailout where pensions were slashed, amounting to more than a 25% 
cut in benefits.) 
2041d. 
205 Judges Ruled Upcoming Pension Cuts as ''Violating Greek Constitution," Keep Talking Greece, Nov. 1, 2012, 
available at http:ljwww.keeptalkinggreece.com/2012/11/01/judges-ruled-upcoming-pension-cuts-as-violating-
greek-constitution/. 
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November of2012, the Court of Auditors declared these austerity provisions unconstitutional as 
violating Articles 2,206 4,207 22,208 and 25209 of the Greek Constitution, conflicting with 
Constitutional obligation to respect and protect human dignity, principals of equality, 
proportionality, and the protection oflabor.210 Although the Court's decision is not legally 
binding on the Greek state, it opens the legal way to anyone who wants to challenge the proposed 
cuts.211 Additionally Giorgos Kasimatis, one of Greece's foremost constitutional scholars, has 
argued since the Court's first Memorandum ruling that the loan agreements violate the Greek 
Constitution.212 Kasimatis states that "the decisions by the [Council of State] violates basic 
tenets of justice" and further argues that ''the court did not examine whether the agreements 
violate specific clauses of Greek law ... instead the decisions were based solely on the basis of 
Greece being in economic need. This is a political decision and not a legal decision."213 
Furthermore, Christina M. Akrivopoulou concerned with the legitimacy of the Greek 
Constitution writes, "during the crisis the liberal, democratic Constitution of 1975 has lost much 
of its ability to adapt to changing political conditions and according to public opinion it has 
failed to provide Greek society with the necessary solutions to exit the crisis. For the majority of 
Greeks, the present Constitution has lost its ability to effectively guarantee the freedoms and 
rights of its citizens."214 
206 GREEK CONST, Part 1, Sec. 1, Art. 2. Principal obligation of the state 
207 GREEK CONST, Part 2, Art. 4. Equality of Greeks. 
208 GREEK CONST, Part 2, Art. 22. The right of work. Social Security. 
209 GREEK CONST, Part 2, Art. 25. Protection and exercise of fundamental rights. 
210 Judges Ruled Upcoming Pension Cuts as 'Violating Greek Constitution," Keep Talking Greece, Nov. 1, 2012, 
available at http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2012/11/0l/judges-ruled-upcoming-pension-cuts-as-violating-
greek-constitution/ 
211 1d. 
212 Michael Nevradakis, Are Greece's Loan Agreements and Austerity Measures Illegal? Greek Constitutional Law 
Scholar Says 'Yes', Huff Post, Oct. 31, 2012 available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-nevradakis/are-
greeces-loan-agreemen b 2046978.html. 
213Jd. 
214 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
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Thus in Greece, the Greek Counsel of State has remained consistently deferential toward 
the legislature's budget cuts, upholding the austerity measures based on the emergency economic 
situations.215 Interestingly however, the "Memorandum regime" has been accompanied by a 
deterioration of the standard of living and the curtailment of constitutional rights which has 
resulted in violent protests around Greece.216 This has created a dynamic situation where 
although the Greek courts are deferential to the legislature, as Akrivopoulou writes, its 
legitimacy is being undermined by not upholding the individual rights protected in the 
Constitution.217 
IV) COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION. 
The U.S. has shown an enormous ability to adapt to the challenges imposed by the global 
financial crisis. Considering the positive experience with the Great Depression, the federal 
government has been allowed to make an extraordinary federal intervention in the economy 
without significant challenges. Furthermore, because the U.S. Constitution confers general 
rights we have seen the ability of the legislature to balance the needs of individual welfare 
against budget cuts considerations. 
The Supreme Court's decision in Blaisdell218 granted relief to debtors from foreclosure 
under emergency circumstances. It allowed the government to alter the terms of an existing 
private contract to serve a broader public interest despite being repugnant to the Contract Clause. 
In the current crisis, foreclosures are rampant, and the Obama Administration granted foreclosure 
215 Kowsmann, supra note 198. 
216 Greek Crisis: Mass Strikes Over Civil Servant Job Cuts, B. B.C. News, Sep. 16, 2013 available at 
http:Uwww.bbc.eo.uk/news/world-europe-24105379. 
217 Akrivopoulou, supra note 134. 
218 Blaisdell, at 416-418. 
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relief 19 and mortgage modification but did not rise to the extraordinary relief granted in 
Blaisdell. Furthermore, it did not rely on the narrower emergency doctrine to pass 
constitutional muster, and allowed for the appropriate level of relief at the discretion of the 
legislature. 
Additionally, unemployment benefits have been extended since 2008, and now are 
currently up for debate in Congress considering their extension.220 The lack of constitutional 
right of unemployment benefits allows Congress to debate the issue and balance other policy 
considerations. This example exemplifies the deference of granting economic relief to the 
legislature allowing them to decided how long and how much without significant constitutional 
challenge. Therefore the absence of judicial activism toward economic recovery legislation 
allows for flexibility through the legislature to determine the best policy. 
Comparatively, in the Eurozone we see two similar constitutional frameworks, Portugal 
and Greece embodying specific individual rights, come to polar opposite conclusions on the 
constitutionality of austerity measures. The balancing under the emergency doctrine of public 
welfare, state interest, and economic emergency against specific individual rights and hardships 
has led to different outcomes. In Portugal its constitution has become a significant roadblock to 
austerity and reform and thus has threatened its acc~ss of credit, a second bailout, and increased 
taxes; whereas in Greece the courts have so-far upheld the austerity measures based upon the 
emergency situation. 
219 Les Christie, Obama administration expands foreclosure prevention program, CNN, Jan. 27, 2012 available at 
http:l/money.cnn.com/2012/01/27/real estate/hamp program/ (The Home Affordable Modification Program 
[HAMP] prevented foreclosures of borrowers by offering principal reduction incentives to private lenders and 
banks rather than a heavier handed alteration of existing contracts through moratoriums.). 
220Manu Raju & Jake Sherman, Unemployment benefits loom in budget talks, Politico, Dec. 6, 2013 available at 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/12/budget-unemployment-benefits-paul-ryan-patty-murray-100790.html 
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Thus because of the deference of Greek courts to its legislature it is an oversimplification 
to argue that because of the U.S. constitutional framework and a lack of judicial activism toward 
recovery legislation allows the U.S. to better manage an economic crisis. On the other hand, the 
experience in Greece exemplifies the dangers of the emergency doctrine being used to undercut 
guarantees of constitutional rights. In the U.S. a health legislative process has resulted in a 
powerful check against such abuses. For instance, I argue that the foreclosure relief and 
extension of unemployment benefits has reduced the sting of the recession and limited 
extremism and violent protest. Whereas in Greece absent any relief to the citizenry has resulted 
in violent protests. 
A relevant Constitutional case has been played out in Detroit's recent bankruptcy 
proceedings. The city of Detroit has been devastated by the Great Recession and with billions of 
debt filed the largest bankruptcy proceeding in the United States history.221 The relevant issue is 
Detroit's contractual obligations toward the payments of the city pensions. 222 Union leaders and 
pensioners claim that the city application for Chapter 9 is constitutional prohibited. 223 The crux 
of their argument is that Michigan's Constitution prohibits the modification of pensions, and thus 
prohibits a Chapter 9 filing, which would all pension benefits to be altered through the 
restructuring of the city's debt.224 They further argue that because Michigan's Constitution 
actually provides that pension benefits "shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not 
be diminished or impaired" the state's Constitution invokes the federal Constitution's protection 
221 Bill Vlasic & Monica Davey, Detroit is Ruled Eligible for Bankruptcy, Dec. 3, 2013, 
http://www.nvtimes.com/2013/12/04/us/detroit-bankruptcy-ruling.html?hpw&rref=us& r=O. 
2221d. 
223 Stephen J. Lubben, Before Detroits's Bankruptcy Proceeds, a Question of Eligibility, N.Y.Times, Aug. 20, 2013, 
available at http:ljdealbook.nvtimes.com/2013/08/20/before-detroits-bankruptcy-proceeds-a-question-of-
eligibilitv/. 
2241d, I 
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under the Contract Clause that prohibits the states from passing any law impairing contracts. 225 
In contrast city officials contend that the Bankruptcy Code, a federal law, overrides conflicting 
state laws, through the Supremacy Clause.226 On Dec. 3, 2013 a U.S. federal Judge Steven 
Rhodes ruled that Detroit was eligible to reorganize under bankruptcy law despite Michigan's 
Constitutional provision.227 Judge Rhodes said that although the city could cut pensions as part 
of the restructuring, however warned that he will not rubber-stamp any pension cuts. 228 
It is clear that the pensioners would have benefitted under the Portuguese or Greek 
Constitutions, but a similar Portuguese Court ruling would have left the City of Detroit insolvent 
and without the protection ofbankruptcy.229 However, similar to in Greece, the federal court 
ruling places a heavy burden on the citizenry especially the city's pensioners. Although in 
Detroit, cutting pensions valued at around $19,000 would substantially limit the effects of the 
safety net for many city workers, in Greece the intensity of the pensions cuts are much heavier 
and has led to widespread poverty and hardship. 230 The difficult part is to balance between these 
two results. Here, the federal government was able to provide Detroit with bankruptcy protection 
and the ability to modify contracts, and allow a limited check on pension cuts. 
In conclusion when considering the implementation economic legislation in an economic · 
crisis the U.S. government under its constitutional framework had the flexibility to best manage 
the crisis. In particular, the case of Portugal showed how strong constitutional socio-economic 
rights, can act as a substantial roadblock to recovery. On the other hand the case in Greece has 
225 Lubban, supra note 235. 
2261d. 
227 Rebecca Cook, Detroit eligible for bankruptcy protection: U.S. judge, Reuters, Dec. 3, 2013, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/03/us-usa-detroit-bankruptcy-judge-idUSBRE9B20PZ20131203. 
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shown the possible abuses of the emergency doctrine and the devastating effects from a lack of 
relief. 
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